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Abstract
The current, persistent growth problem in Zimbabwe is often attributed to poor economic
and political institutional frameworks characterised by insecure property rights and an unreliable
rule of law. An empirical test of this hypothesis presents some methodological di¢ culties.
Although political scientists have been constructing measures of social and political dimensions
of societies for some time, such measures are not available over su¢ ciently long time runs
to inspire con￿dence in their usefulness in being able to address the long-run and dynamic
questions that arise when linking economic performance and institutions. The aim of the paper
is to assemble a new set of political and economic institutional indicators for Zimbabwe covering
the period 1946 to 2005. While the new indices span for a signi￿cantly long time period, they
are highly correlated with existing, widely used institutional indices produced by the Freedom
House, the Heritage Foundation and the Fraiser Institute. The new data set will contribute
towards understanding the institutional dimension of Zimbabwe￿ s persistent economic decline.
1 Introduction
Since the late 1990s, the Zimbabwean economy has been grappling with a state of rapid and con-
tinuous socio-economic deterioration. Per capita annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been
declining continuously at an annual average rate of 6.2% since 1999 (see table 1). Although the
country experienced episodes of negative growth between 1964 and 1995, none of the recessions were
as persistent as the current recession that started in 1999 (see ￿gure 1). Accompanying the poor
growth rate is a continuously worsening hyper-in￿ ationary environment. The in￿ ation rate hiked
from 65% in 1999 to 240% in 2005. Domestic and foreign investment also fell rapidly. For instance,
the net foreign direct investment (FDI) declined from its historically high level of US$444 million in
1998 to an annual average of below US$150 million in the subsequent years. In addition, the gross
￿xed capital formation (GFCF) fell from an annual average rate of 20% in the 1990s to 15% in 2005.
[Insert table 1 about here]
A variety of factors ranging from unfavourable climatic conditions1 to policy-related macroeco-
nomic imbalances2 have been o⁄ered to account for Zimbabwe￿ s persistent growth problem. However,
there is a view that the weak economic and political institutional framework characterised by insecure
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1property rights and an unreliable rule of law is at the centre of the persistent growth problem.3 This
view accords well with the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature which argues that strong
economic and political institutions are fundamental ingredients for good economic performance.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Institutions are de￿ned along a wide continuum but North￿ s (1990) view of institutions has
become widely accepted. North (1990) de￿nes institutions as rules of the game or humanly devised
formal and informal constraints shaping human interaction in political and economic activities. In
contrast to the traditional growth theories which focused on capital accumulation and technological
innovation as the major determinants of economic growth, the NIE emphasise the importance of
property rights protection, contract enforcement and the rule of law.4
In light of the above, an understanding of the determinants of long-term economic outcomes in
Zimbabwe is important. While investigating the role of macroeconomic and geographical factors
is not a major challenge, testing the hypothesis of the long-term link between economic outcomes
and institutions does present methodological di¢ culties. The di¢ culties arise because there is no
universally agreed way of measuring institutions. Furthermore, most existing empirical indices
measuring institutions have limited time coverage, thus limiting their usefulness in country-speci￿c
studies.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to evaluate the nature of both political and economic
institutions in Zimbabwe for the period 1946 to 2006. This will be achieved by constructing indicators
of formal or de jure property rights and political freedoms. In addition, we also build a de facto
political instability index covering the period 1950 to 2006. The resulting database enables the
testing of several hypotheses on the long-term link between institutions and economic outcomes.
The lengthy time period is chosen following the suggestion by Kaufman and Mastruzzi (2003)
that the likelihood of observing signi￿cant changes over time in institutional variables increases
substantially with the length of time under consideration. We will also undertake a comparative
analysis of the institutional structures in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This will be done using the
data set for Zimbabwe constructed in this paper and the data set for South Africa constructed in
Fedderke et al. (2001).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two outlines the theoretical framework. This
is followed by the literature review on the measurement of institutions and the link between economic
performance and institutions in section three. Section four details the empirical methodology for
constructing the de jure property rights and political freedom indices. In sections ￿ve and six, the
empirical methodology is applied to the construction of de jure political freedom and property rights
indices for Zimbabwe respectively. Section seven presents the construction of a de facto political
instability index. Section eight presents a comparative analysis and section nine concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
North (1990) o⁄ers a useful framework for considering both the measurement of institutions and the
impact of institutions on economic outcomes. North views the institutional framework as comprising
both formal and informal constraints governing economics and politics. There exists a continuum
with unwritten taboos, customs and traditions at the one end of the continuum and constitutions
and formal laws governing economics and politics at the other end. In the absence of formal rules,
a dense social network leads to the development of customs, laws, trust and normative rules that
constitute an informal institutional framework.
The relationship between the formal rules and informal constraints is very complex and not
clearly understood (North, 2005). As such, the combined e⁄ects of formal and informal institutions
on economic outcomes are also not very clear. North however remarked that the way in which the
3See, for example, the arguments in Richardson (2005a, 2005b) and Bates (2006).
4 North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2004).
2economic and political interactions take place depends not only on the formal rules and informal
constraints de￿ning the incentive structure but also on the e⁄ectiveness of the enforcement of the
rules. Therefore, institutions are weak when sub-optimal rules are enacted and/or when optimal
rules are poorly enforced.
On the link between institutions and economic outcomes, the NIE emphasise the need to start
with democratic political institutions and other checks and balances on the government as a mech-
anism for securing property rights.5 Once such institutions are in place, investment in human and
physical capital and therefore economic growth are expected to follow. The Hayek-Friedman hypoth-
esis refers to this transmission mechanism in which political institutions have positive externalities
in fostering economic freedoms, thereby increasing the propensity to undertake economic activity.6
The NIE however, does not suggest indivisibility between political and economic institutions. Divis-
ibility is regarded possible when autocratic regimes such as the People￿ s Republic of China choose to
maintain relatively high degrees of economic freedom such as the security of private property rights.
However, under democratic political institutions, the probability that economic freedoms will be
well de￿ned is higher since rational voters have self interested motives to support politicians who
support economic freedoms. By contrast, autocratic regimes lack such self-regulating mechanisms
and will adopt economic freedoms only by choice.
An alternative hypothesis linking institutions and economic outcomes is that advanced by Lipset
(1959). Lipset￿ s central proposition is that minimum threshold levels of economic development and
human capital are required in order to sustain democratic political institutions. The postulated
link is thus from economic development to political institutional development. This perspective in
which causality stems from economic development provides little theoretical insights on the possible
impact of institutions on economic growth.
However, the two alternative views outlined above both emphasise the need to secure property
rights to support investment in human and physical capital and they both see such security as a
public policy choice. Fedderke (1997) and Wu and Davis (1999) also supported the dominance of
property rights over other institutional factors in explaining di⁄erent patterns of economic devel-
opment across countries and over time. It is argued that the role of property rights in lowering
the uncertainty associated with interaction between economic agents increases both the volume and
growth of exchange between economic agents, hence improving economic growth.
3 Empirical Literature Review
3.1 Measures of Political and Economic Institutions
The political science and political economics literature o⁄ers several attempts to quantify both
economic and political institutions. This section surveys literature on indicators of property rights
and political freedoms.
Although there are several empirical measures of political freedoms, there is no universal agree-
ment among scholars regarding the ways of empirically measuring political freedom or political
democracy. Existing indicators of political freedoms can be subdivided into objective and subjective
measures. Attempts to use objective measures include the use of voter turn out statistics (Leaner,
1958; Vanhanen, 2000); the composition of the legislative and executive branches of government
(Cutright, 1963; Vanhanen, 1990, 2000); or the franchise in a political system (Cutright and Wiley,
1969). Bollen (1980) and Bollen and Paxton (2000) argued that these are invalid indicators of polit-
ical freedoms, since they are in￿ uenced by many factors that are only marginally related to political
rights and political liberties.
The subjective indicators rely on expert judges who rate countries￿standing on various aspects of
5 See, for example, North and Thomas (1973), North (1990) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004).
6 See Fedderke (1997).
3political freedoms such as fairness of elections, the freedom of the media, or the liberties of political
groups. These subjective measures dominate the practical and scholarly usage because there are
generally viewed as better measures of institutional frameworks when compared to the objective
indicators (Bollen and Paxton, 2000). Here, we review some of the key opinion-based indicators of
political freedoms.
To begin, we consider the Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liberties. The political
rights measure, scaled from 1 to 7 (where, 1= free and 7 = not free), is a measure of the degree
of political competition and the right of citizens to choose their leaders. The civil liberties index,
similarly scaled, is a measure of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. Although the
Freedom House indices have a wide country coverage, their time span is limited starting from 1972
onwards.
Bank￿ s (1971) Cross-Polity Time-Series includes categorically scaled variables measuring the
freedom of group opposition, competitiveness of nomination process of the chief executive and the
legislature and the e⁄ectiveness of the elected legislative body in undertaking its duties. Bollen (1980,
1990) computed measures of political democracy based on two core concepts, political liberties and
popular sovereignty. Each of these concepts is operationalised using a combination of subjective
and objective data. The political democracy data is available on ￿ve-year intervals starting in
1960. Bollen￿ s work cautions against the use of democracy indicators that confound democracy with
political stability as these are two related but separate concepts that should be treated di⁄erently.
Jaggers and Gurr (1995) assembled a political dataset called the Polity III, now updated to Polity
IV. The most commonly used measure in the dataset measures is the variable called ￿constraints
on the executive". The variable considers the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-
making power of the executive. It is measured on a 1 to 7 scale with higher scores representing
good institutions. Another important measure of political institutions in the Polity IV data set is
the democracy measure. The democracy measure captures three main elements. These include the
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express e⁄ective preference about
alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutional constraints on the exercise of power
by the executive and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of
political participation. The polity IV data set covers all independent states starting in 1800 with
annual updates.
Fedderke et al (2001) constructed an index of political freedoms for South Africa that is based
on a global interpretation of the status of both political rights and civil liberties. In building up
the index, their methodology made extensive use of the formal legal framework governing political
freedoms. The major advantage of the indicator is that it stretches from 1935 to 1997, a time period
long enough to allow the use of the index in addressing long-run issues that arise when studying the
link between political institutions and economic growth. Furthermore, the use of actual laws in the
statute books as the rating information yields indicators that do not confound de jure institutions
with de facto outcomes. The major limitation though is that the index is only available for South
Africa, and therefore cannot be used for cross-country comparative studies.
More recently, Kaufman et al (2003, 2005) produced several indicators of governance for the
World Bank. The governance concept here is much broader in dimension than the indicators above.
The six clusters of governance covered are voice and accountability, political stability, government
e⁄ectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Each of the six clusters of
governance is obtained by combining a number of opinion based sub-component indicators drawn
from a variety of sources. The methodology of construction uses an unobserved components model
which expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function of an unobserved component
of governance plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors. This model yields estimates for
each of the six governance measures.
Although the Kaufman et al (2003) indicators have the advantage of drawing from a wide range
of information, some of the assumptions of the underlying model are limiting. The model assumes
that the distribution of governance is normal with a non-shifting zero mean and a unit standard
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time. A further limitation is that the indicators span for a very short time period, starting in 1996,
thus limiting their usefulness in single country time-series studies.
Not much work has been done to quantify property rights. Single time point measures are
constructed by the Fraser Institute in the compilation of the index for Economic Freedoms in the
World (EFW) by Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1975-1996) and Gwartney and Lawson (1997-2006).
The Heritage Foundation produces annual scores of property rights protection as part of their index
of economic freedom (Johnson and Sheehy, 1996-2006). This index is available on an annual basis
starting from 1996. Fedderke et al (2001) also evaluated the formal structure of property rights
in South Africa for the period 1950 to 1997 by considering the legal and constitutional framework
governing protection of immovable property.
De￿ciencies of indicators of property rights is coupled with increasing scepticism on the use of the
Freedom House indices as proxies of contract enforceability, security of property rights and rule of
law. In response, some academic researchers such as Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) are
increasingly turning to subjective ratings marketed to international investors by ￿rms specialising
in political risk evaluation.
The major ratings services include the Business International (BI henceforth), the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG henceforth) and the Business Environmental Risk Intelligent (BERI
henceforth). Using the ICRG institutional data, Knack and Keefer (1995) constructed an index
to capture security of private property and enforceability of contracts. The index loads on ￿ve
ICRG indicators of expropriation risk, repudiation of contracts by government, rule of law, quality
of bureaucracy and corruption in government.
There are some drawbacks associated with the institutional indices outlined above. Most of
the indices are not available for a comprehensive width of geographical coverage, for a range of
countries over di⁄erent levels of development and cultural space, and over su¢ ciently long time runs
to inspire con￿dence in their usefulness in being able to address the long-run and dynamic questions
that arise when linking economic performance and institutions. The short time coverage of most
existing measures of institutions has resulted in the Freedom House indices dominating empirical
work linking institutions and economic outcomes. The two Freedom House measures of political
rights and civil liberties have the most comprehensive coverage across countries and over time when
compared to most existing indicators.
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) used the Freedom House civil liberties index as a proxy for eco-
nomic rights such as freedom from expropriation. The same index was used by Scully (1988) to
measure what he called the￿￿institutional framework￿comprising the degree of political, civil and
economic liberties of nations. Grier and Tullock (1989) employed the same index again as a proxy
for the ￿political infrastructure￿ , a measure of the extent of civil liberties of nations. More recently,
Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997) used the Freedom House civil liberties indicator to measure
the ￿quality of governance￿ .7 This feature renders the possibility of distinguishing the independent
impacts of di⁄erent institutional dimensions on economic performance, particularly in the context
of a web of association between social and political indicators pointed to by Fedderke and Kligaard
(1996, 1998).
Again, due to the limited time coverage of empirical indicators, most econometrics-based studies
that link institutional frameworks of nations and economic outcomes tend to rely on cross-country
or panel data that may lead to biased results due to heterogeneity across countries. In order to
resolve these methodological issues, there is need to build comprehensive country-level data sets of
institutional indicators that span lengthy time periods.
7 Other studies that have also used the Freedom House indexes to proxy for various aspects of the institutional
environment include, Barro (1996), Helliwell (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Savvides (1995).
53.2 Impact of Institutions on Economic Performance
Empirical studies linking institutions and economic performance vary depending on the choice of
institutional indices used. In the early work, linking political institutions and economic growth,
Grier and Tullock (1989) used the Freedom House civil liberties indicator. They constructed a
dichotomous variable from the civil liberties measure in which the countries in the two most repressive
categories were distinguished from all others. The new dichotomous variable was described as proxy
for the ￿political infrastructure￿of nations. They found that political repression is associated with
a signi￿cant reduction in annual growth rates in Latin American and African samples, but that
repression has no e⁄ect in the Asian sample.
A later set of studies investigating the relationship between regime type and economic growth
interpreted the Freedom House political freedoms and civil liberties indexes as measures of democ-
racy. Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) found that these indicators are positively related to growth
only if variables such as educational attainment and investment rates are omitted as explanatory
variables. They concluded that any bene￿cial impacts of democracy on growth may operate through
factor and human capital accumulation. Helliwell (1994) and Barro (1996) support Lipset￿ s (1959)
hypothesis that the positive relation between income levels and democracy is most attributable to
the former￿ s impact on the latter rather than vice versa.
Using the Freedom House indices, Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997) analysed the impact
of the civil liberties and political freedoms on the performance of World Bank-￿nanced projects
in various developing countries for the period 1974 to 1993. They found that the rates of return
are higher in nations with greater civil liberties, as measured by the Freedom House civil liberties
indicator. However, pure political rights, as measured by the Freedom House political rights index,
have no e⁄ect on the rates of return to the World Bank projects.
Other studies linking political institutions and economic outcomes make use of composite institu-
tional measures. Mauro (1995) aggregated BI￿ s indices of judiciary e¢ ciency, red tape and corruption
into a composite index which he called bureaucratic e¢ ciency. The BI indices are integers between 0
and 10 with higher values of the indices representing goods institutions. The study found a positive
and signi￿cant relationship between the bureaucratic e¢ ciency index and the average per capita
GDP growth rate over the period 1960 to 1985 for a sample of 123 countries. The ￿ndings imply
that an improvement in institutions is associated with higher levels of per capita GDP growth rate.
While the above studies consider the role of political institutions only, theory emphasises the
importance of property rights. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) presented some of the earliest e⁄orts
to empirically link property rights and economic growth. They used the Freedom House civil liberties
as a proxy for property rights. They acknowledged that the civil liberties index is not intended to
measure economic rights, but argued that the two were likely to be correlated. Their results suggested
that property rights indirectly in￿ uences economic growth in a positive manner through investment.
Knack and Keefer (1995) investigated the impact of property rights and contract enforcement on
economic growth and factor accumulation. To measure property rights and contract enforcement, the
study aggregated the ICRG indices of expropriation risk, repudiation of contracts by government,
rule of law, quality of bureaucracy and corruption in the government. The composite index of
property rights and contract enforcement was signi￿cant in investment regression but insigni￿cant
in the growth regression. The ￿nding con￿rms an indirect e⁄ect of property rights and contract
enforcement on growth through investment.
Acemoglu et al (2001) addressed the problem of endogeneity that arises in studies linking property
rights and economic outcomes. Endogeneity arises when there are feedback e⁄ects from economic
performance to institutions. Empirical results will be biased if endogeneity is not taken into account.
Acemoglu et al (2001) then used mortality rates of colonial settlers as an instrument of property
rights. They argued that while settler mortality rates had an important impact on the quality of
past institutions that were built in countries colonised by the main European powers, the mortality
rate was not endogenous to economic performance. The study found that property rights have a
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Rodrik et al (2002) examined the extent to which geography, integration and institutions could
explain the variation in cross-national incomes world-wide. Following Acemoglu et al (2001), they
used settler mortality rates as an instrument of property rights. They concluded that property
rights play a dominant role in explaining economic performance when compared to geography and
integration.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) established the relative importance of ￿contracting institutions￿
versus ￿property rights institutions￿for economic growth. Contracting institutions are de￿ned as
those institutions supporting private contracts. They de￿ned property rights institutions as those
constraining government and elite expropriation of private property. Property rights were proxied by
three indicators, Polity IV￿ s constraint on the executive measure, Political Risk Services￿assessment
of protection against government￿ s expropriation and the Heritage foundation￿ s assessment of private
property protection. The results suggest that while the property rights institutions have ￿rst order
e⁄ects on long-run economic growth, investment and ￿nancial development, contracting institutions
only matter for ￿nancial intermediation.
To sum up the literature review, we note that several measures of institutions have been produced
and employed in empirical work linking institutions and economic outcomes. While there is no
consensus on the most appropriate way to measure institutions, perception based indices appear to
dominate empirical work.
4 Empirical Methodology
The literature survey has shown various attempts to quantify the structure and quality of various
dimensions of institutions. This paper follows closely the methodology in Fedderke et al (2001) in
constructing institutional indicators for Zimbabwe. The rationale for adopting this methodology is
twofold. Firstly, by using formal legislation instead of political and economic outcomes for evaluating
the status of rights, the methodology safeguards against the problem pointed out by Glaeser et al
(2004) of generating outcome based indicators that do not measure institutions as per the North
(1990) view of institutions as constraints. Secondly, the resulting new data set is comparable to the
data set of South Africa in Fedderke et al. (2001).
In assessing the institutional environment, annual ratings of the status of rights is based exclu-
sively on formal legislation. We note at the outset that such an exercise presents some methodological
and conceptual di¢ culties.8 Here we present the more prominent ones:
1. The indexes summarise a large amount of information across a range of distinct dimensions.
Inevitably, any concrete state at any given point in time realises fully de￿ned rights in these
distinct dimensions to di⁄ering degrees. Hence, the composite aggregate index will inevitably
hide the important changes that take place within these dimensions.
2. The rating process may be a⁄ected by the prevalence of ￿judge-speci￿c method e⁄ects￿(Bollen
and Paxton, 2000). These are perceptual biases of the judge making the subjective rating.
Judge-speci￿c methods e⁄ects may enter the rating at any of the three levels of the rating
process, namely, 1) the collection of the rating information 2) the evaluation of the information,
and 3) the transformation of the evaluation into an actual value. The e⁄ect of such biases is
to reduce the precision of the indicators.
The methodology employed for this study attempts to limit the subjectivity problem as far as
possible by adopting the following rigorous steps as suggested by Bollen and Paxton (2000) and
Fedderke et al (2001):
8 See Bollen (1990, 1992) for a detailed discussion of di¢ culties that emerge in the case of the construction of
political (and property) rights indexes.
71. First, the construction of the political freedoms and property rights indexes will proceed by
de￿ning the relevant set of criteria to be used in evaluating the rights. The relevant set of
criteria is informed by an appropriate theoretical conceptualisation of the rights or freedom of
concern.
2. Guided by the ideal structure of the rights, sub-component variables of the index are identi￿ed.
3. Rating scales for the sub-components are set using a participatory approach which involves
experts (political scientists, political economists, property lawyers and social scientists) assign-
ing weights to the di⁄erent sub-components. The guiding principle is to assign heavier weights
to sub-components that are more fundamental to the rights being evaluated.
4. Rating information is collected from various secondary sources. In this case, rating is based
explicitly on enacted legislation.
5. Once the sub-components and ratings scales have been determined and the rating information
collected,9 rating of sub-components is done. This is done using the delphi technique which
involves a team of experts assigning scores to each of the sub-components on an annual basis.
Ratings for any given year are done relative to the previous year￿ s score. The sub-components
are then aggregated into a composite additive score for each year. This is an advance over the
Fedderke et al (2001) methodology in which separate components are only implicitly evaluated
in building up the overall index with no explicit scores being provided for the sub-components.
The advantage of this rating procedure is that it reduces the aggregation bias and also enables
an analysis of individual sub-components.
6. The last step involves a presentation of the indexes to an independent panel of leading social
scientists, political economists and lawyers who are well versed with issues in Zimbabwe. Ad-
justments to the measures are undertaken on the basis of the feedback. This is done in order to
limit the perceptual biases that might arise from the delphi sessions. In this study, the newly
constructed indices were presented to various panels of experts at several local and regional
conferences and one international conference.
In the next two sections, we discuss the construction and interpretation of the political freedom
and property rights indices for Zimbabwe for the period 1945 to 2005.
5 Political rights and civil liberties in Zimbabwe: 1946-2005
5.1 Identi￿cation of an ideal state of political freedoms
We note at the outset that the notion of political freedoms or democracy is much debated. This
study makes no attempt to provide an exhaustive review of the debates. We adopt the three
theoretical dimensions of a contemporary liberal democracy advanced by Jaggers and Gurr (1995).
The ￿rst dimension is institutionalised political competition accomplished through establishment of
regular and meaningful competition among individuals and groups, an inclusive degree of political
participation in the selection of leaders and policies. The second dimension is the existence of
institutionalised constraints on the exercise of executive power. The ￿nal dimension is the guarantee
of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.
The three theoretical dimensions are operationalised by setting the following normative ideal
criteria. This constitutes a nation state with a legal and constitutional structure that embodies the
following features:
9 The database of laws used in the Delphi technique sessions is available from authors upon request.
81. An electoral system with a universal adult franchise in which there is no exclusion from par-
ticipation on the grounds of race, colour, creed or sex and in which free and fair elections take
place on a regular and precisely determined basis.
2. Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression, political association and assembly.
3. Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion and freedom of choice with respect to personal
matters such as vocation and sexual orientation.
4. Constitutional provisions to check and exclude the arbitrariness and discrimination in the
application of laws.
5. Legally entrenched freedom of movement and the right to reside in an area of choice within
the territorial boundaries of the relevant polity.
6. A free press constrained only by the laws of libel and defamation and very precisely de￿ned
and limited constraint with respect to matters of ￿ national security￿ .
7. A bill of rights or some equivalent, constitutionally robust, mechanism to e⁄ectively protect
the rights of individuals.
8. A division of power between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
The above normative ideal criteria can also be equated to a ￿Rechtsstaat￿in which fundamental
justice exists and government authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written,
publicly disclosed laws.
5.2 Scaling and rating of sub-components
Guided by the normative ideal criteria, the rating instrument is based on a check list of 12 sub-
components covering the two broad areas of political rights and civil liberties. Raw points are
awarded to 8 of the sub-components using a 10 point scale. These include voting rights, freedom
of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the extent of arbitrary executive power,
independence of the judiciary and the legislature, government secrecy or indemnity and the due
process of law. A score of 0 represents the enactment of legislation that completely limits the rights
of interest, while a score of 10 shows the enactment of legislation that promotes or extends rights.
These 8 categories yield a total of 80 raw points.
The remaining 4 categories are awarded raw points on a 0-5 scale. These include freedom of
movement, academic freedom, religious freedom and a residual category that captures all discrim-
inatory law that cannot be classi￿ed under any of the speci￿c dimensions. These categories yield
a total of 20 raw points. Summing across all categories gives 100 points as the highest number of
points that can be awarded to the political rights and civil liberties indicator. The implied relative
weighting re￿ ects the importance of certain dimensions over others in the overall composite index.
The rating information is obtained from various secondary sources.10 The ￿nal political freedom
index is an addition across all the sub-components.
A score between 0 and 12 would be indicative of a de jure ￿totalitarian￿ state of the type
exempli￿ed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Stalin years. A score between 13
and 37 would indicate a state with political and civil rights structure in which a very high degree
of arbitrariness in state action is enabled by legislation as well as having highly discriminatory or
￿exclusive￿franchise arrangements. For a score between 38 and 50, the degree of arbitrariness in
governmental action is more constrained.
10 Palley (1966), Saller (2004), The Human Rights Bulletin (various issues) by Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights,
an index to legislation in Zimbabwe from Kubatana.net, the International Labour Organisation online Natlex.
9A score between 51 and 74 would indicate considerable scope for ￿procedural justice￿such as
￿due process￿and reasonable scope for the exercise of choice in matters of political and social asso-
ciation, though such a system might contain some formal discriminatory provisions and constraints
on personal liberty as well as restrictive franchise arrangements. A score between 75 and 87 would
indicate a political system with entrenched procedural justice and freedom of association and assem-
bly, subject to relatively few constraints. This leaves the 88 to 100 range for fully developed liberal
democracy with recognition of third generation rights.
5.3 Outcomes of the rating
Some caveats need to be issued at the outset. First, for the purposes of this measure, no attempt is
made to establish the degree of ￿￿t￿between the formal speci￿cation of rights and freedoms within
legislation and the likelihood that such legislation would be acted upon. Thus, it is irrelevant to this
indicator whether or not any of the statutes were actually applied.
Second, unlike the Freedom House indexes, formally speci￿ed political rights and formally spec-
i￿ed civil liberties are not separated. As such, the measure is based on the global interpretation of
the state of the political rights and civil liberties in each year under consideration.
Third, in covering a long period as we have done, issues of commensurability may arise. This is
due to the fact that over the period 1945 to 2006, Zimbabwe went through various complex phases
of legal regimes making it impossible to assume a uni￿ed political system. During the period under
review, at least six distinct constitutional dispensations may be identi￿ed:
1. The ￿rst constitutional dispensation covers 1945 to 1960 during which the 1923 constitution
was in place. This resulted in Britain granting internal self government to the white population
in Rhodesia.11 This saw the inauguration of a unicameral legislative assembly elected by a non-
racial franchise e⁄ectively limited to whites by way of high income and property requirements.
2. The second constitutional dispensation occurred from 1961 to 1964 with the adoption of a new
constitution in 1961. It is during this phase that Britain￿ s reserved powers over local legislation
were completely relinquished and replaced by a bill of rights in the new constitution.
3. The third constitutional dispensation occurred from 1965 when a new constitution was pro-
mulgated after UDI. This stretches to 1968.
4. The fourth constitutional dispensation was a period of bicameralism and a voters￿roll de￿ned
on an explicitly racial basis extending from 1969 to 1978.
5. The ￿fth constitutional dispensation was that of the 1979 constitution produced as a result
of internal settlement agreement between the Smith government and the conservative Black
Nationalist Parties.
6. The ￿nal constitutional dispensation is the current constitution adopted in 1980 as a result of
the Lancaster House Peace Agreement.
Figure 2 plots the sub-components of the political freedom index. The graph is cumulative
showing how each of the 12 sub-components contributes to the overall index. The aggregate index
is sketched out in ￿gure 3.12
[Insert ￿gure 2 about here]
11 Zimbabwe￿ s name prior to independence.
12The rating information is available upon request from the authors.
105.4 Interpretations of the Political Freedom Index
It is evident from ￿gure 3 that the country experienced a decline in the quality of political freedoms
from its base year in 1946 up to 1960. This is expected since the mid 1940s to late 1950s experienced
a steady stream of legislation that impinged on fundamental political and civil rights of the native
Africans. Such an institutional framework re￿ ected the desire of the European elite to prevent both
political and economic competition from the Africans (Blacks). Speci￿cally, the electoral franchise
was severely limited to the Europeans (whites) through the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1951
specifying high income and property requirements, which in reality were out of reach of the Black
majority. Freedoms of association, assembly, expression, movement and the due process of law were
severely restricted during this time through the enactment of legislation such as the Native (Urban
Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1951, the Municipal Act of 1953, the Public Order
Act of 1955 and the Native Registration and Identi￿cation Act of 1957. This legislation was used
by the government to sti￿ e political dissent and to limit personal freedoms.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
There is a sharp dwindling of formal rights between 1959 and 1960. This follows enactment of
￿security laws￿which severely violated fundamental rights. Examples of such legislation include the
Preventive Detention (Temporary) Provisions Act (1959), Public Order Amendment Act (1959), the
Unlawful Organizations Act (1959), the Vagrancy Act (1960), Emergency Powers Act (1960) and
the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act ( 1960). These Acts gave the government wide discretionary
powers to arrest and detain without trial and to restrict assembling for political reasons. Further
constraints on the freedoms of movement, association and assembly during this two-year period are
found in the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959.
In the early 1960s, the ruling United Federal Party (UFP) recognised that political and economic
exclusion of Africans was not consistent with its goal of industrialisation. The institutional frame-
work kept African average incomes at persistently low levels, which in turn led to very low internal
demand. Low demand was in turn detrimental to the realisation of a sustainable internally-driven
industrialisation process. This internal inconsistency led to the liberal reforms of 1961 aimed at
political and economical advancement of the Africans.
The abrupt improvement of the political freedoms in 1961 was due to the legislative reforms in
the 1961 constitution which sought to increase enfranchisement of Africans and introduce minimum
representation for Blacks in the House of Assembly. The constitution introduced the ￿rst ever
entrenched bill of rights, while 1961 also saw the repulsion of the most discriminatory laws such as
the Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act. However, the attempted institutional transformation
was abortive because in 1962, the UFP lost power to the conservative Rhodesian Front (RF) which
had the backing of white workers, agrarian and petty bourgeoisie.
The future of African political and economic advancement became bleak when the conservative
RF came into power. The immediate e⁄ect was an increase in acts of insurgency by Black Nationalist
movements. As the government came to grips with the state of increasing political dissent, formal
rights started declining from their seemingly ￿better￿state in 1961 through the enactment of repres-
sive legislation. This phenomenon continued throughout the 1960s. After the RF government, led by
Smith, unilaterally declared independence from the colonial power in 1965, another constitution was
promulgated. This gave the government wide discretionary power to declare states of emergency, to
arrest and detain opponents without trial and to censor publications. Compared to the ideal state,
this represented a serious violation of fundamental rights. The situation continued to worsen as the
liberation war intensi￿ed and government became determined to restore socio-political stability.
The inception of independence in 1980 marked the beginning of an era in which there was a new
dispensation in the structure of formal political rights. The distinct improvement in 1980 followed
the enactment of the Employment Act which repealed a number of discriminatory laws such as
the African Juveniles Employment Act, the African Labour regulations Act, the Foreign Migratory
Labour Act as well as the Masters and Servants Act. The Public Service Commission Act of the
11same year removed racial restrictions to entry into the public service. The major improvement was
also an outcome of the entrenched bill of rights and provisions for the immediate enfranchisement
of all African adults contained in the 1980 Lancaster House Constitution. Further but steady
improvements were realised as more discriminatory laws were repealed in the years that followed.
The situation however started deteriorating again in 1985 as a result of the continuous enactment
of legislation allowing for arbitrary state action at the expense of the individual rights. The key
acts contributing to this trend between 1985 and 1992 were the Presidential Powers (Temporary
Measures) Act of 1986, the Constitutional Amendment No 7, No 9 and No 10. The Constitutional
Amendment Act of 1993 which provided for the imposition of a death penalty resulted in yet another
sharp fall in the level of rights. The subsequent acute worsening in the formal rights in 2002
was a result of the enactment of the Public Order and Security Act, the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, Labour Relations Amendment Act and the Presidential Powers
(Temporary Measure) Election Act Modi￿cation Notice. Together, these acts greatly limited the
electoral franchise and the freedom of expression and association.
6 Property Rights in Zimbabwe
The property rights index constructed relates to immovable property, with particular focus on land.
The rationale for focusing on immovable property is that the Zimbabwean economy is primarily an
agro-mining economy implying that immovable property such as land plays a huge role in facilitating
economic transactions. The methodology again follows an initial identi￿cation of an ideal set of
rights. Zimbabwe￿ s realisation of this ideal set of rights is then examined with reference to the
most important pieces of legislation a⁄ecting these rights over this period. The resulting index
corresponds to the procedural rules constraining state and elite￿ s expropriation and not outcomes of
whether there is actual expropriation.
6.1 Identi￿cation of an ideal state of property rights
Although there are variations in both philosophical and legal spheres of what constitutes property
rights, we follow the lead of Waldron (1988) who used Honore￿ s de￿nition of ￿full liberal ownership￿ .
Honore (1961) sets out eleven ￿standard incidents￿or common features of ownership which comprise:
￿ The right to the possess.
￿ The right to use.
￿ The right to manage.
￿ The right to the income.
￿ The right to the capital value.
￿ The right to security against expropriation.
￿ The power to transmit.
￿ The lack of any term on the possession of these rights.
￿ A duty to refrain from harmful use.
￿ Certain judgments against the owner may be executed on the object.
￿ Incident of residuarity.
12Waldron (1988) noted that Honore￿ s list of standard incidents only provides common features of
ownership. In his work, Waldron (1988) argued that the prohibition on harmful use is better regarded
as a general background constraint on action than speci￿c rules of private property and thus should
be ruled out. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study, some dimensions are eliminated. The
right to income is incorporated into the right to use the property as the owner sees. Absence of
term and incident of residuarity shall be excluded on the basis that it does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the transaction costs of carrying out economic activity. Thus the ￿ideal￿set of property rights will
constitute the following seven incidents:
￿ Right to possess.
￿ Right to use.
￿ Right to manage.
￿ Right to capital.
￿ Right to security.
￿ Incident of transmissibility.
￿ Liability to execution.
6.2 Scaling and Rating of sub-components
The scale for property rights is also de￿ned to range from 0 to 100. The full existence of all seven of
the above incidents in the above de￿nition are used as the ￿ ideal￿set of property rights and would
be equivalent to 100 points. Any variation from this would thus correspond to a less than perfect
score. The complete exclusion of these rights or incidents would thus result in a score of zero for a
society.
Raw points are awarded to the various sub-components using varying scales. The right to possess
which we consider as the most critical dimension of ownership has a scale ranging from 0-20. A
score of zero is an indication of the enactment of legislation that curtails ownership rights while the
opposite is true for a score of 20. The right to use, right to capital, right to security and the right to
transmit are scaled from 0 to 15, where a score of 15 is an indication of the enactment of legislation
that extends the right of interest whereas the opposite holds for a score of 0. The remaining two
incidents are scaled from 0-10. Summing across all incidents gives a total score of 100 points, which
coincide with the ideal set of property rights. The implied relative weights again show the relative
importance of the certain sub-categories in the composite indicator.
6.3 Outcomes of Rating
Because of the colonial history in Zimbabwe, the construction of a realistic property rights index
presents further methodological di¢ culties. The di¢ culties arise because restrictions on rights to
immovable property, especially land, were executed along racial lines during the colonial era (up to
1980). During this period, rights over land held by Africans (Blacks) were not of the same character
as the rights enjoyed by the Europeans (whites) and international capital in respect of the land
which they were able to purchase (Palley, 1966).
The post-independence land ownership rights derive a lot from this colonial legacy of dualism
in land ownership. Land ownership rights are expressed in the four main systems of land tenure,
namely freehold (private), state land, communal and leasehold (resettlement) systems. The freehold
(private) tenure system is prevalent in the commercial farming sector that is predominantly owned by
white commercial farmers and transnational companies. The other forms of tenure (communal and
resettlements), which are non-freehold primarily apply to black owned land. With such a dualistic
13tenure, a single property rights indicator would not re￿ ect the limitations or extensions to property
rights experienced by di⁄erent sectors.
The Fedderke et al (2001) study on South Africa faced a similar constraint. The study resolved
this limitation by producing a single index which is implicitly weighted by the availability of land
to the relevant racial groups and by the population distribution between di⁄erent racial groupings.
To overcome such a constraint, we evaluate the security of rights in the freehold and non-freehold
tenures separately. The resulting two de jure property rights indices are then combined into a
composite index using two di⁄erent weighting systems.
The index denoted by PRFH captures the structure of formal property rights in the freehold
land tenure and PRNFH captures the status of formal property rights in the non-freehold tenure
systems. Figure 4 plots the sub-components of the PRNFH while the aggregate PRNFH index is
shown in ￿gure 5. The sub-components of the index of property rights in the freehold tenure system
(PRFH) are depicted in ￿gure 6 while the resulting aggregate index is shown in ￿gure 7.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
The two indexes are weighted into a composite property rights index ￿rst using the proportions
of land available to the di⁄erent tenure systems, and then using population distribution between
di⁄erent racial groupings. Figure 8 presents the property rights indices resulting from the two
weighting methods.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
6.4 Interpretations of the property rights index
Changes in the institutional framework prior to independence mainly re￿ ect changes to laws regu-
lating the non-freehold tenure systems. The colonial period was characterised by an entrenched and
stable institutional framework for the freehold-tenure systems in which ownership was dominated
by the whites and transnational capital. In the post-independence era, especially after 1990, there
was however increased turbulence in the formal laws regulating privately held land regardless of the
origin or race of owners.
The composite index Propert1 based on the proportions of land available to the di⁄erent tenures
places almost equal weights to the two separate indices and therefore fails to capture the unequal
access to land and resources by di⁄erent sectors of the economy. In contrast, the index Propert2,
which employs racial proportions, attempts to factor in the racial misalignments in the institutional
framework for land ownership.
For purposes of tracking the overall structure of formal property rights, we choose Propert2,
which we denote propert in the rest of the study. Our choice of this composite property rights
index is based on the Acemoglu et al (2004) argument that good economic institutions are those
that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad
cross-section of the society and not a minority. Propert2 scores take into account the accessibility
to land and resources by di⁄erent sectors of the economy.
Now we turn to the interpretation of the property rights index. The physical and qualitative
division of land between Blacks and whites was legalised initially through the Land Apportionment
Acts of 1930 and 1941. The provisions of this act allowed the government to partition the land into
European areas, African areas (Tribal Trust Lands), an unreserved area and national land. The
tenure systems as well as scale and quality of land were lopsided in favour of the whites and foreign
￿rms.
The deterioration of the status of property rights in 1951 resulted from the enactment of the
Land Husbandry Act. The act made special provisions allowing the government to remove Africans
from the Tribal Trust Lands if the need arose. It also prescribed stringent measures to force African
14farmers to de-stock their cattle and modify land tenure practices. In terms of individuals￿property
rights, this constitutes a serious restriction on the right to security from government expropriation
and the ability of an individual to use the property.
The improvement to the formal rights in 1961 is a result of the adoption of the 1961 constitution
which gave the legislature power to amend the Land Apportionment Act and to make provisions
for opening up land to Blacks. In the same year, the Land Apportionment was amended to create
a category of land open to all races. In 1969, the Land Tenure Act was passed to repeal the Land
Apportionment Act, which was the pillar of unequal access to immovable property by di⁄erent races.
Although more land was set aside for black ownership, this was done within a framework that sought
to further formalise dualism of land ownership.
Independence in 1980 saw the inception of the Lancaster House Constitution. It provided for the
constitutional protection of all private property. The constitution also prescribed that the acquisition
of private property by the government should be on a ￿willing buyer, willing seller￿basis and that
compensation for the acquired land should be at market price, promptly paid in the currency of
the land owner￿ s choice. One perspective of these ingrained provisions of the Lancaster House
Constitution was that they served to protect existing rights and interests in land belonging mainly
to white commercial farmers and some transnational companies. In contrast, another perspective is
that these provisions imposed constraints on the government￿ s ability to enhance access of the poor
and other marginalised groups to land and land resources.
Beginning in 1985 up to the mid 1990s, the government made several changes to the legal frame-
work directed towards addressing the historically unbalanced access to immovable property. Such
changes were contained in the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 5) of 1985 and (No 11) of
1990, the Mines and Mineral Act of 1987 and Land Acquisition Act of 1985, re-enacted in 1992 with
some amendments. These changes were implemented within the framework of fair compensation
and thus posed no serious threat to private property.
1994 marks the beginning of an era in which formal property rights started deteriorating. This is
because of the constitutional amendments removing the constitutional protection of compensation
for land. The biggest blow came in 2000, when the government amended the constitution for the
sixteenth time removing government￿ s obligation to pay compensation to the owners of land acquired
for land reform process shifting the onus to Britain, the former colonial power. Further deteriorations
came in the subsequent years as government introduced further amendments to legislation that were
aimed at limiting the jurisdiction of the courts over the land issue.
7 Political Instability in Zimbabwe: 1950-2005
7.1 Conceptual Framework
The notion of instability adopted in this study captures the idea of socio-political unrests and dis-
turbances. The reasoning being that when instability reaches high levels, socio-political instability
disrupts market activities which in turn a⁄ects productivity and therefore returns to investment
(Alesina and Perroti, 1996). Moreover, political instability may result in bad economic policy for-
mulation either because (a) governments choose not to improve the e¢ ciency of policy-making, since
they anticipate an imminent loss of power,13 or (b) because the unstable political systems results
in weak governments that are unable to change and improve policy formulation. However, Olson
(1982) argues that very high levels of political instability may be desirable, since it destroys the hold
on the state exercised by powerful interest groups who are more concerned with the imposition and
maintenance of redistributive policies than with sound growth enhancing economic policy.
The index is constructed on the basis of o¢ cial and uno¢ cial sources, which are placed in a
weighted composite index of instability in accordance with alternative weights. The choice of the
13 See Olson (1993).
15sub-components to include in the index is informed by past literature as well as availability of
information. The political instability series contains the following sub-components:
1. The number of declarations and renewals of states of emergencies per year.
2. The number of publications banned per year.
3. The number of politically motivated arrests per year.
4. Number of reported cases of politically-related property damages per year.
5. Incidences of war-related armed attacks on the general public per year.
7.2 Description of Variables and Data Sources
Information on the number of declarations and renewal of states of emergency and the number of
publications banned per annum is obtained from Ramussen and Rubert (1990, 2001). Renewals of
states of emergency are also considered against the background of continuous states of emergency
between 1965 and 1990. Information on the number of politically motivated arrests was obtained
mainly from archival material ranging from newspapers to political magazines.14 The Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace report on the Matabeleland political unrests in the 1980s, and
provided useful information on the disappearances and detentions that occurred during this time.
Although it is acknowledged that accuracy of the information is questionable, the ￿gures at least
give a picture of when political violence was at its peak. Property damages that are considered
here are those associated with political violence. The source of such information is the Zimbabwe
Human rights NGO forum political violence reports and the Catholic Commission for Justice and
Peace reports. The number of armed attacks data is obtained from the Alesina et al (1996).
7.3 Interpretations of the political Instability Index
There is no a priori standard for weighting the above sub-components into a composite political
instability index. Given this uncertainty surrounding the appropriate weighting, we use di⁄erent
weightings. Figure 9, 10 and 11 present the results of the di⁄erent weightings. Our expectation
is that weighting 1 in ￿gure 9, which places more weight on war related political violence closely
depicts the variation of the level of social and political unrests over time in Zimbabwe. According
to ￿gure 9, peaks in political and social instability occurred in 1960, 1965, the period 1975 to 1979,
the mid-1980s, and the period 2000 to 2003.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
[Insert Figure 10 about here]
[Insert Figure 11 about here]
Although the formation of a number of African nationalist political parties opposed to the Eu-
ropean economic and political domination started in the 1950s, the real warfare only began in 1960
intensifying in the mid-1970s up to the time of independence in 1980.
In the late 1990s particularly 1999, two major factors contributing to increased political instability
can be identi￿ed. Firstly, the argumentation of civil society opposed to government policy through
the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a coalition of non-governmental or-
ganisations, academics and university students. The NCA successfully campaigned for the rejection
of a government-led constitutional change in the 1999 Constitutional referendum. The government￿ s
loss in the referendum and desire to win in the 2000 Parliamentary elections led to a violent crack-
down on the civil society coalition and the newly formed opposition political party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). Secondly, violent and unconstitutional farm invasions also contributed
towards high levels of socio-political unrests.
14Research assistants from the University of Zimbabwe Political Science department gathered all the archival data
used in this study.
168 Comparative Analysis
To check the e¢ cacy of the new series of institutional indices constructed in this paper, we compute
correlations between our indices and other widely used existing empirical indices of political freedoms
and property rights. Table 2 presents the non-parametric spearman correlation coe¢ cients.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We compare our political freedoms indicator (PolFree) to the Freedom House (FH) indices of
political freedom and civil liberties and the Vanhanen (2000) democratisation index. The new index
PolFree runs from 1946 to 2005. The Freedom House indices are perception based and available
for the period 1972 to 2005. The Vanhanen (2000) democratisation index is an objective-based
measure which combines several variables such as voter turn out and the percentage of parliamentary
seats taken by smaller political parties. For Zimbabwe, the Vanhanen democratisation index covers
the period 1980 to 2005. The PolFree index correlates highly with the Freedom House political
freedom index and the Vanhanen democratisation index with correlation coe¢ cients of -0.76 and
0.89 respectively (see table 2). However, correlation between PolFree and the Freedom House civil
liberties index is very low and insigni￿cant.
The property rights index is compared to the Fraser Institute (FI) and the Heritage foundation
(HF) indices of property rights. Our property rights index (Propert) has a 0.74 correlation with the
Fraser Institute property rights index and a 0.82 correlation with the Heritage Foundation property
rights.
While, a perfect measurement precision is not possible from our procedure, the high correlations
between our indicators and other existing indicators raises our con￿dence on the e¢ cacy of the new
set of institutional indices.
We now turn to the relationship between political freedom and property rights. There is a low
and insigni￿cant correlation of 0.27 between the indices PolFree and Propert. This con￿rms the
divisibility of the two forms of rights. With regards to the relationship between political instability
and the rights indexes, it is shown that political instability bonds well with property rights with a
signi￿cant correlation of -0.72. However, political instability stands in no relationship with political
freedoms with a low and insigni￿cant correlation of 0.08.
We now turn to the comparison of the formal institutional frameworks in South Africa and
Zimbabwe. Historically, the two countries￿legal frameworks were closely linked implying a close tie
in their formal institutional structures (Sprack, 1974). In his analysis of the relationship between
legal frameworks in South Africa and Rhodesia,15 Sprack (1974) refers to Rhodesia as ￿South Africa￿ s
sixth province￿just to demonstrate how well connected the legal frameworks were. Given these close
historical links, our analysis here seeks to unveil how this association has changed over time.
Figures 12 and 13 compare the status of political freedoms and property rights in Zimbabwe and
South Africa respectively. Data on the South African indicators is obtained from Fedderke et al.
(2001). While the status of political freedoms was at par in the mid-1940s, the situation deteriorated
more rapidly in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. With the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe
in 1980, the Lancaster House constitution was adopted and most of the discriminatory laws were
repealed. This created an even wider gap between the two countries. The situation remained
unchanged until 1990 when Apartheid was abolished and South Africa became a democratic nation.
Ever since the 1990s, ￿fundamental justice￿and rule of law have been advanced in South Africa and
made available to all races. However, Zimbabwe￿ s case has been deteriorating mainly due to the
continued use of legislation as tool to suppress political dissent as well as personal freedoms.
[Insert Figure 12 about here]
[Insert Figure 13 about here]
Figure 13 compares the property rights indices in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is clear that
although Zimbabwe￿ s ratings are better compared to South Africa up to the mid-1980s, the situation
changed after the mid-1980s. Whilst de jure property rights in South Africa continued to improve
15Zimbabwe￿ s name prior to independence in 1980.
17since 1976, those in Zimbabwe remained stagnant only improving marginally in some years until
1985, when the ratings in South Africa began to surpass those in Zimbabwe.
9 Conclusion
The major purpose of the paper was to assemble new institutional indicators for Zimbabwe that can
be used in country-speci￿c time-series work linking institutions and economic outcomes. This has
been achieved by the construction of the following indices:
￿ A de jure political freedom index for the period 1946 to 2005.
￿ A de jure property rights index for the period 1946 to 2005.
￿ A de facto political instability index for the period 1950 to 2005.
Although the paper closely follows the Fedderke et al. (2001) methodology, some methodological
improvements were attained by scoring sub-components of the indexes individually. This has the ad-
vantage of reducing aggregation biases as well as allowing the analysis of individual sub-components.
Comparison of the series raises some concrete questions.
Four main issues arise from the new set of institutional indices. The ￿rst issue is the relationship
between political freedoms and property rights. A low correlation was found between the two indices
implying a high degree of divisibility between the two forms of rights. The independency of the two
would imply that even autocratic regimes may accompany sound property rights.
The second issue is the relationship between political instability and the rights indexes. It was
found that political instability bonds well with property rights but has no signi￿cant relationship
with political freedoms. Third, the new indicators correlate fairly well with some existing commonly
used institutional indices thus raising our con￿dence on the validity of our own measures. However,
unlike the Freedom House indexes of political freedoms and the Fraser Institute property rights
index, our indexes are available for a relatively longer time period allowing con￿dence in their use
to address long-run issues.
Fourth, the study also provides a comparative analysis of the structure of formal rights between
South Africa and Zimbabwe. There seems to surface the conclusion that while the two countries
might have had close historical ties, both have travelled di⁄erent paths with regards to developments
in their political and property rights institutions.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators for Zimbabwe 




FDI inflows in US$ GFCF 
% of GDP 
1964-1970  3.88 2.5 ---- 12.46 
1970-1979  0.71 7.0 18.47 16.98 
1980-1989  1.38 12.09 -4.88 16.18 
1990  3.82 15.00 -12.22 18.21 
1991  2.65 31.00 2.79 20.58 
1992  -11.30 28.00 19.00 22.36 
1993  -1.28 22.00 38.00 23.59 
1994  6.93 21.00 41.00 21.37 
1995  -1.77 10.00 117.70 24.58 
1996  8.43 26.00 80.90 18.04 
1997  1.05 16.00 135.10 18.05 
1998  1.43 37.00 444.30 17.06 
1999  -4.79 65.00 59.00 13.25 
2000  -8.87 56.00 23.20 11.79 
2001  -3.54 122.00 3.80 11.00 
2002  -5.08 151.00 25.90 9.01 
2003  -10.97 263.00 30.00 12.58 
2004  -4.42 350.00 60.00 15.42 
2005  -5.98 240.00 102.80 15.00 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
 
 
Table 2: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 












PolFree    1.000         
Political Freedom (FH) 
-
0.7612*           1.000         
Civil Liberties (FH)  0.2866  0.2190      1.000       
Vanhanen Democratisation 
Index 0.8232*           
Propert 0.2761  -0.1898  0.4600*    1.000     
Propert (FI)  0.0275  -0.0946  -0.4808*   0.7427**  1.000   
Propert (HF)         0.8212*     





Notes: * denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Per Capita GDP Annual Growth Rate in Zimbabwe: 1964-2005 
 
 




















Figure 5: The Property Rights Index in the Non-Freehold Tenure (PRNFH) 









Figure 7: The Property Rights Index in the Freehold Tenure 
 
 
Figure 8: Composite property rights indices: 1946-2005 
 
25Figure 9: Political Instability Index (Weighting 1): 1950-2005 
 
 




Figure 11: Political Instability Index (Weighting 3): 1950-2005 
 
 




Figure 13: Property Rights: Zimbabwe Compared to South Africa 
 
27